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From December 2001 through April 2002, a group of students from the biology department of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University conducted a survey of Almaty residents, with the goal of discovering their attitude toward the plans to import and bury foreign radioactive waste on the territory of Kazakhstan.

A total of 1010 persons were questioned, primarily young people between the ages of 15 and 27 (931 persons, or 92.2%).
Questions:

1. What are the most severe problems facing the Republic of Kazkahstan?

А. Low standard of living – 241 persons (24%).

B. Corruption – 252 (25%).

C. Environmental situation – 265 (26%).

D. Unemployment – 252 (25%).

E. Other. Some respondents, after choosing one of the points above, named a number of other problems, including drug addiction, AIDS, the economic crisis, the unsatisfactory demographic situation, sex discrimination, violation of children’s rights, dealing with strategic military sites located in Kazakhstan, and the fact that the government fails to pay sufficient attention to the problems that worry the population of the republic.

2. Do Kazakhstan’s environmental problems worry you?

А. Yes – 952 (94%).

B. No – 58 (6%).

3. Which environmental problems, in your opinion, are the most important?

А. Industrial pollution – 286 (28%).

B. Household wastes – 240 (24%).

C. Desertification – 221 (22%).

D. Radioactive pollution – 263 (26%).

E. Other. The answers virtually duplicated the points above.

4. What do you think the danger of radioactive waste consists of?

А. Сause the greenhouse effect – 99 (9.8%).

B. Increase the cancer rate – 802 (79.4%).

C. Hard to say – 106 (10.5%).

D. Other: radioactive wastes aren’t dangerous; if properly handled, radioactive wastes pose almost no danger; background radiation increases only in the places were wastes are buried – 3 (0.3%).

Some respondents named a number of other problems, including the genetic effects of radiation and the threat to the life of all living things.

5. How do you feel about the possible import and burial of foreign radioactive waste on the territory of Kazakhstan?

А. For – 53 (5%).

B. Against – 899 (89%).

C. Hard to say – 58 (6%).

6. Argue the case for your point of view on the fifth question.

53 persons (5%) voted “for”:

Including the following:

А. It will enable the country to obtain funds to solve environmental problems – 18 (34%).

B. It will make it possible to pay compensation to the members of the population who suffered previously from environmental problems – 15 (29%).

C. It will help the development of the nuclear industry – 20 (37%).

D. Other. Answers virtually duplicated the points above.

This group of respondents named the most severe problems of Kazakhstan as follows:

– low standard of living – 14 (27%)

– corruption – 16 (30%)

– environmental situation – 10 (19%)

– unemployment – 13 (24%),

and the most important environmental problems:

– industrial pollution – 15 (28%)

– household wastes – 13 (25%)

– desertification – 13 (25%)

– radioactive pollution – 12 (22%).

899 persons (89%) voted “against”:

Including the following:

А. Economic inexpediency – 196 (22%).

B. Environmental danger – 369 (41%).

C. Violation of the human right to a healthy environment – 334 (37%).

D. Other. Some respondents, after choosing one of the points above, put forth a number of other arguments, including the following: it will damage our country’s international reputation; it will create a threat to the health of the population; due to the high level of corruption, the funds received will be misused; Kazakhstan lacks the necessary technology, and its specialists are not sufficiently prepared for such work.

58 persons (6%) responded “hard to say”:

Including the following:

А. Contradictory information – 15 (26%).

B. I have not determined my position – 32 (55%).

C. This is the first time I have heard about this problem – 11 (19%).
The survey organizers express their sincere gratitude to all who helped conduct the survey, as well as to the survey participants.

Material prepared for publication April 25, 2002; translated into English September 4, 2002.

Translated by Glenn Kempf

ANTINUCLEAR CAMPAIGN
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Vladimir Mikhailovich Kuznetsov graduated from the Institute of Energy in 1980. From 1979, he worked at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in various positions, from an operator in the reactor department to senior engineer for reactor management. He completed graduate studies at the I.P. Bardin Central Scientific Research Institute for Ferrous Metallurgy. From 1987, he worked for the State Atomic Inspection Service, occupying posts from engineer-inspector in the environmental inspection service for supervision of safe exploitation of atomic power stations in the Administration of the Central Region of the USSR State Atomic Inspection Service, to head of inspection for supervision of the nuclear and radiation safety of atomic energy sites for the State Atomic Inspection Service of the Russian Federation. He was the youngest head of inspection in the entire history of the State Atomic Inspection Service (36 years old). Together with his colleagues, he spoke as an initiator for the closure of more than 10 Russian atomic energy sites, in connection with the dangers of their further exploitation. As a result of pressure from above, he was forced to leave the Russian State Atomic Inspection Service in 1992.

Vladimir Kuznetsov is the director of the program for nuclear and radiation safety of the Russian Green Cross (RGC), a member of the Higher Environmental Council of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on the Environment, a member of an association of independent experts on the safe use of atomic energy in the Russian Federation, a member of the International Technical Committee for Standardization of TK-322 (“Atomic Technology”), and an active member of the Russian Environmental Congress.

He is the author of the following books:

State Radiation, published in Russia and Great Britain in 1994 with the assistance of the International Chernobyl Safety Foundation;

Russian Atomic Energy, Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: A Look by an Independent Expert, published in 2000 with the assistance of the National Press Institute;

The Chief Problems and the Modern State of Safety of Enterprises in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, published in 2002 with the assistance of the Russian Green Cross, and the Center for Journalism of War and Peace.

He is also the co-author of the following books:

A Guide to Guaranteeing Radiation Safety During the Localization and Liquidation of Radiation Accidents and Catastrophes at sites in Russia, published in 1997 with the assistance of the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations;

The Radiation Legacy of the Cold War, published in 1999 with the assistance of the Russian Green Cross;

Floating Atomic Power Stations: A Threat to the Arctic, the World Ocean, and the Regime of Nonproliferation, published in 2000-2001 with the assistance of the Russian Green Cross and the Center for Environmental Policy.

He has published more than 120 articles in the Russian and foreign press, devoted to the problems of the safe use of atomic energy in Russia and beyond.

Question: Can you comment on Kazatomprom’s drive to introduce amendments to current legislation, with the goal of legalizing the import and burial of radioactive waste from other states on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan?

Answer: In 1992, my first book came out, in which there are some interesting figures. I juxtaposed information on stores of radioactive waste with data from the last census. It turned out that in Kazakhstan for every member of the population, including infants and elderly people, there are 25 tonnes of radioactive waste. And no one has refuted these figures.

Now, it seems to me that the situation has become even more serious. Such affairs are attracting the interest not of specialists, but of people for whom the financial side comes first. If only these people (not only in Kazakhstan, but everywhere) had at least a vague idea of the level of the problems connected with radioactive waste!

The problem of radioactive waste has always had an impact on the speed of development of atomic energy in a country. If this problem is solved, then atomic energy will develop. In Kazakhstan, apart from the BN-350 plant that operated in the city of Shevchenko (now Aktau) (now it’s no longer in operation), and apart from the factories and installations involved in the nuclear fuel cycle, there are no other atomic energy sites. Nevertheless, there exist serious problems within the country (in Stepnogorsk, in Ust-Kamenogorsk), including those involving low- and mid-level nuclear waste, the storage of over a hundred thousand tonnes of thorium monoxide, and also stocks of metallic thorium. These are very serious problems in and of themselves, and to take on still more problems—I don’t understand it!

First the problems that exist in the country at this stage need to be solved, and only then can we talk, for example, about importing radioactive waste that its territory can accommodate. Incidentally, to do this you need to have regional storage sites, which Kazakhstan doesn’t have. You need to have facilities for processing radioactive waste. There aren’t any such facilities. Even Kazakhstan’s closest neighbor—Russia—has far too few. And we know that in order to build such facilities requires colossal amounts of financing. The fuss that was raised in Russia last summer, in connection with the importing here of spent nuclear fuel, is indicative. There was powerful opposition, but we know how the Ministry of Atomic Energy solved that particular problem. I’m sure that the residents of Kazakhstan don’t even suspect what sums of money were spent. As an example, I can cite the material that was published in the newspaper Novaya gazeta. In this material, data are cited that on the order of $50 million went towards “work” with the corps of deputies, in order for the introduction of the amendments to succeed. At the same time, a strange system exists in both Russia and Kazakhstan—decisions are made by people who have nothing to do with the problems of atomic energy. They have neither the corresponding education, nor the work experience.

For instance, in Russia decisions regarding this issue were taken in the following way. I prepared a report on the problems of safety at enterprises in the nuclear fuel cycle, which I gave to a Nobel laureate, Academician Aleksandr Mikhailovich Prokhorov, to review. After all, he is a physicist, and a Nobel Prize carries a lot of weight. Having examined these documents and my book, Prokhorov wrote his conclusions and send them to Gennady Seleznyov [then speaker of the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament]. In his conclusions (four pages long), all of my materials were dealt with in detail, and it was written in black and white “…to halt the legislative process.” Academician Prokhorov recommended ending the consideration of the draft law until the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) had created a special commission bringing together interested organizations, and until the issue had been studied from all sides and recommendations prepared for the corps of deputies on whether or not to approve amendments to the law. The Academy of Sciences did not examine my report or Aleksandr Prokhorov’s conclusions, although we sent these materials to the Academy in advance. Independently of Greenpeace, we collected signatures on behalf of such organizations as the Moscow Society of Naturalists, one of the oldest environmental societies in Russia, whose history began in 1847. The society is headed by the director of Moscow State University, Academician Sadovnichy, a person who also carries a great deal of weight in the scientific world. He wrote a letter to the Academy recommending what issues it needed to consider. This letter was signed by another ten academicians. However, no one listened either to them or to Academician Prokhorov. The deciding factor was blood ties; therefore, the decision was taken by Myasoyedov, Zhores Alferov, and Robert Nigmatullin—the brother of the former deputy minister of atomic energy…
Question: Doesn’t it seem to you that the amendments passed in Russian legislation, and the campaign launched in Kazakhstan for the passage of analogous amendments, are links in a single chain?

Answer: In that regard, Kazakhstan is going even further than Russia. If amendments on spent nuclear fuel have been passed, the new law, which was published literally only two months ago, says that the import, processing, and storage of radioactive waste in Russia is forbidden. After all, the situation in Russia with regard to nuclear waste is rather more serious than in Kazakhstan. Because in Kazakhstan only one facility has lived out its time, and in Russia there are more than thirty active energy blocks, plus processing enterprises, that serve the nuclear fuel cycle. These include Tomsk-7, Krasnoyasrk-26, and Chelyabink-65 (or “Mayak”). However, even so we still have places for the storage of such wastes. In some places there are facilities where they are processed. In spite of that, the problems of radioactive waste are problems that hold back the country’s development of atomic energy. I think that it’s this problem that will hold back the development of atomic energy for the next 100-150 years. We already know what can happen with liquid radioactive waste from the example of the explosion of the storage site at Chelyabink-65 in 1957. We know that Russia doesn’t have facilities for the utilization of radioactive waste; these wastes end up in collector layers, as it’s done in the city of Dimitrograd, at the Institute for Atomic Reactors, at Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26. And at Chelyabink-65 radioactive wastes are dumped into the open hydrosystem, the Kechinsky cascade of water bodies. Many in Kazakhstan probably know what’s going on with the Kechensky cascade, since it’s not far from the territory of Kazakhstan.

Question: That is, you think that from a technical point of view the burial of radioactive waste from other countries in Kazakhstan is simply impossible to carry out?

Answer: Kazakhstan has neither the facilities, nor the opportunities, nor the personnel. The trained personnel that were in Shevchenko—both those who worked on the production of the uranium concentrate itself, and those who occupied with the operation of the BN-350—have gradually left. The best-trained specialists transferred to the Beloyarsk atomic power station. There they’re building a BN-800, a more powerful reactor than the one that operated in Kazakhstan, and than the BN-600 (the third block of the Beloyarsk plant). What Kazatomprom is hoping for—I just don’t know. If we draw a parallel with Minatom [Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy], the main stumbling block for the Duma wasn’t the technical issues, because none of those deputies knows the whole story either, and that’s a very unpleasant thing. The structure of Minatom’s expenditures, as a rule, is kept under the stamp of secrecy; therefore only six out of the 450 deputies have access to the secret articles describing its spending..

Look at what happened in Russia in November 2001. The Accounting Chamber, headed by Sergei Stepashin, conducted a detailed study of how the state program for radioactive watse and spent fuel had been carried out, how the money for that program had been spent. Money from the state budget. And they came to the conclusion that money had been spent by Minatom inappropriately, and they named a six-digit figure! And that’s in Russia. What can we say about Kazakhstan, where the situation is even worse?
Question: Who profits from the introduction of the legislative amendments regarding the import of radioactive waste, apart from Kazatomprom itself? Perhaps there are other countries interested?

Answer: Of course there might be interested countries, including some in Asia, which are located closer to Kazakhstan. All of them would be pleased as punch to dump their own radioactive waste that exist in one form or another, except, of course, for the gaseous ones.

I’ve been following this information. About a year ago I worked in Ust-Kamenogorsk, and I know the whole system. Kazakhstani customs repeatedly detected contraband imports of nuclear fission materials: both uranium concentrate and radioactive scrap metal. They enter Kazakhstan under the guise of scrap. In reality, this is solid waste. If Semipalatinsk [nuclear test site] isn’t enough for Kazakhstan, if Kazakhstan doesn’t have enough [uranium] tailing sites and storage sites for thorium monoxide in Ust-Kamenogorsk, if the problems in Stepnogorsk and Aktau aren’t enough, let people close there eyes to this and take the decision to store radioactive waste in their own country.

But that’s not the biggest problem. The main thing is that fact that you won’t get anything from this waste except headaches, like the one left over from the Chernobyl accident, from the accidents at Krasnoyarsk-26 and Tomsk-7. Equipment was left contaminated, and it’s lying under the open sky and rusting. Do you really think that if there might be something useful from this waste, this equipment would still be lying around? The wastes that we have would probably have been processed, if we could have gotten something useful out of them. Of course, my opponents might say that on the territory of the Leningrad atomic power station (Sosnovy Bor), a factory was buolt for processing low-level radioactive scrap metal. However, this is the same headache, because that factory hasn’t passed even one expert examination.

I was the chairman of a number of committees for public environmental expertise regarding both floating atomic power stations, and on the atomic heating station at Tomsk-7. Everywhere, it all came down to the fact that it’s not possible to obtain complete documentation and financial accounting for expenditures. Even though they promise to provide full documentation, it was never exhaustive. It’s not enough that these expenses are just “scrawled on somebody’s knee.” Revenues for spent fuel were calculated the same way, and as a result, there appeared the figure of $20 billion, which we will allegedly receive.

In these calculations, analogies are drawn with the Japanese factories of Kajema or Befeu. If this is the case, however, the sum ought to be three times greater. If Russia will receive $20 billion, the idea of $60 billion simply collapses. The same is true here.

The span of a human lifetime is insignificantly small in comparison with the lifetime of radioactive wastes. These people who are fighting for this—once they’ve gotten their share, they’ll simply flee the country, and they could absolutely care less what happens in their homeland with this radioactive waste. And in 30-40 years, the storage sites will begin leaking and the facilities will cease to exist. The government of Kazakhstan will face the fact that they’ll either need to import foreign spare parts to keep the facilities in working order, or they’ll need to pay for new imported facilities, and those, unfortunately, won’t come cheap. These people won’t be paying for these facilities out of their own pocket.

In making such dangerous plans a reality, independent experts ought to be recruited. Yes, you could say that there aren’t many of these independent experts, that there aren’t enough of them, but they do exist. If you want your work to be reinforced by something, you need to seek out people who will sign off on your ideas. And these should not be specialists from Minatom or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who will never give a negative conclusion. These conclusions should not be signed by people who stand, as it were, on the other isde of the development of atomic energy. For example, on the one side—Minatom, on the other—Greenpeace. For objectivity, neither the one nor the other should take part in the expertise. These experts should possess a specialized education, work experience, and a spotless reputation for the last, say, 10 years of their activity.

October 1, 2002

Translated by Glenn Kempf

Translated into English November 23, 2002

ANTINUCLEAR CAMPAIGN
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We, the children of the 21st century, are not left in peace by the glory of our ancestors, who left us a rich heritage of mythology. Unfortunately, our age has no Homer to call its own. People have changed, and subjects as well. The ancient Greeks created myths to glorify their gods and their native Hellas. Modern mythmakers create them in order to absolve themselves of all responsibility and to sell off their own country more cheaply.

The myth of how Kazatomprom suddenly saw the light.

In the year 2001 A.D., Kazatomprom [Kazakhstan’s state nuclear power company] had a sudden revelation: the country faced a severe problem of radioactive contamination, which had to be solved.

Evidently, Kazatomprom’s bureaucrats are suffering from a loss of memory. How else can one explain the fact that they seem to have suddenly remembered this problem, while the entire country knew about it already at the beginning of the 1990s? At that time, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan passed Resolution No. 1103, “On Urgent Measures for Improving the Radiation Situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” on December 31, 1992. The resolution should have served as a guide for immediate action. Instead, however, the state agencies mentioned in the resolution probably took it as a New Year’s greeting—there is no other way to explain the cause of their modest silence, when the question the results of its fulfillment are raised (1).

Why were the laws “On the Use of Atomic Energy” (1997), “On Environmental Protection” (1997), and “On the Radiation Safety of the Population” (1998) passed? Why was the 1996 government resolution “On Procedures for Maintaining a State Cadastre [List] of the Burial of Hazardous Materials, Radioactive Wastes, and Discharges of Wastewater and Minerals” on the territory of Kazakhstan adopted? Finally, why was the National Action Plan for Environmental Hygiene for the Republic of Kazakhstan created in 2000, including the section “Radiation Safety of the Population”?

Moreover, in the 1998 law “On the National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” in Article 21, “Guaranteeing Environmental Security,” it is stated that “the prevention of radioactive and chemical pollution and the biological contamination of the country’s territory” is “the obligation of the appropriate state bodies and organizations, regardless of the form of property, officials, or citizens involved” (2).

However, the “appropriate state body” saw the light only in 2001. It turns out that the country is in danger! In order to save it, however, Kazatomprom, rather than suggesting that the existing laws be carried out, proposed amending them.

The time has come to think: where is the real environmental threat coming from? From radioactive wastes left without sufficient attention, or from utter disregard for the country’s laws?

The myth of Kazakhstan’s fantastic poverty.

In order to earn money for to solve the problem of its own radioactive waste, Kazatomprom proposes importing and burying waste from other countries, since Kazakhstan has no money of its own!

To do this, the country’s existing legislation needs to be amended to permit the import and burial of foreign radioactive waste. The supporters of such imports believe that cleaning up Kazakhstan’s radioactive contamination will require $1.11 billion (3).

It’s true that announcements that the country has no money are already a surprise to no one. Far more interesting was hearing a chorus of voice saying, “There is money!” “The country does have money,” admitted deputies, specialists, scientists, and virtually all those present at the conference “The Import and Burial of Radioactive Waste in Kazakhstan: A Dialogue Between Government and Civil Society,” on October 29-20, 2001.

The aforementioned Resolution 1103 of 1992 had already prescribed that “The State Committee on the Economy and the Ministry of Finances of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in developing their annual predictions and budget plans, will stipulate the allocation of funds to for targeted financing of environmental work on radioecology” (Pont 2).

On July 25, 2001, Resolution No. 1006 of the Government of Kazakhstan, “On Confirmation of the Program for Conservation of Uranium-Mining Enterprises and Liquidating the Consequences of the Working of Uranium Deposits for 2001-2010” was issued. The resolution indicated that “the chief source of financing for all work for the conservation of uranium-mining enterprises and liquidation of the consequences of working of uranium deposits is the state budget. This does not exclude, however, the possibility and the need to attract non-budgetary funds, particularly targeted funding from uranium-mining and processing companies.”

Furthermore, in 2001 150 million tenge were allocated from the state budget, which constitute “100% of the stipulated annual plan,” “for the conservation and liquidation of uranium mines, as well as for the burial of man-made wastes” (4).

Finally, in 2001 the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan was created, which currently contains $1.6 billion (Kazakhstanskaya pravda, May 9, 2002). Why not use its money for the benefit of future generations and solve a painful problem?

All the same, Kazatomprom insists on the import and burial of waste! There argument? We need money!

Why aren’t there enough funds for burying our own waste? Because they mysteriously disappear. Just like in a fairy tale, also the reason is far from magical: the shadow economy, corruption, and flat-out theft. Evidently, in Kazakhstan it’s easier to import radioactive waste than to get rid corruption, which has reached alarming levels (5).

However, it should not be forgotten that there are not that many around the world who want to stain themselves with radioactive money. Even a tiny country like the Marshall Islands refused to allow the construction of a plant for processing radioactive waste from other countries, even though it has no large oil reserves, no coal, and no other mineral resources, our country’s countless reserves of which are trumpeted on every street corner (Marshall Islands Journal, April 8, 1998).

The myth of Greeks bearing gifts.

Kazatomprom claims that the burial of foreign radioactive waste will bring Kazakhstan enormous revenues.

It predicts that over the course of 30 years, the burial of foreign radioactive waste could yield on the order f $30-40 billion (Panorama, April 26, 2002).

Why on earth do our nuclear officials’ colleagues overseas so easily refuse to take advantage of such a profitable business? Because the hopes of receiving enormous profits are entirely illusory.

Isn’t this a case of Greeks bearing gifts?

Virtually all countries having a nuclear industry take care of the burial of their own radioactive wastes. At the same time, in the opinion of the authors of the Nuclear Encyclopedia, not one country in the world to date had buried wastes from elsewhere on its own territory (6). The world market for low- and mid-level radioactive wastes, cited by Kazatomprom and the parliamentary deputies initiating the amendments (7), simply does not exist!

However, even though the world lacks any such cases, the supporters of waste imports are easy to understand. The simply can’t forget about the gift of Prometheus. They cannot stand not to capture the “glow” of radioactive waste on the investing Olympus and bring it to their own people. Only—what kind of investment reputation will be formed about a country after such an operation, and what kind of international precedent might be created? About this, unfortunately, they have not taken the time to think.

It only takes stepping onto this path even once, and the radioactive trail will last for many, many generations to come… And, as usual, the full weight of the burden will lie on the shoulders of ordinary people, not the initiators of the imports!

To date, not even the technological and economic grounds for the project have been presented for consideration by parliament, nor have the results of environmental expertise. All calculations, according to specialists, have been done hastily, literally “scribbled on someone’s knee.” After all, even Russia, which has high technology and the necessary staff of specialists, in the opinion of experts, cannot hope to receive $20 billion from the reprocessing of other countries’ spent nuclear fuel (8).

The myth of a miracle.

The money received as payments for the burial of waste will go toward improving Kazakhstan’s socio-economic situation.

Dear readers, if you seriously think that, please let us ask you one single question. If enormous sums of money have disappeared in our country thus far, what will keep them from disappearing this time? Even the World Bank has begun to reconsider its conditions for providing aid to Kazakhstan, making them directly dependent on the implementation of political and institutional reforms and transparency in the management of oil revenues. Therefore, its has developed three possible scenarios for the provision of credit to Kazakhstan (9): first—the money will disappear as before; second—it will disappear, but not so quickly; third—it will hardly disappear at all. In the third case, evidently, it is presumed that a miracle will have occurred!

The myth of the strict observance of the law.

In order to observe the strictest possible legality in resolving the aforementioned problem, a number of parliamentary deputies have put forward a new definition of “law.”

Dura lex, sed lex—“the law is harsh, but it is the law,” the ancient Romans believed. A group of deputies—the initiators of the new amendments—have developed a new definition; the law is “a formal limitation.” This is the point of view from which they look at the articles of current laws that prohibit the import and burial of foreign radioactive waste (3). Will these “formal limitations” be removed or not? It looks as though this question is increasingly devoid of meaning, since the legal acts previously passed to guarantee the population’s radiation safety have not been fulfilled. Moreover, the people in charge prefer not even to remember them.

How far democracy has come in our country! Another step, and we will be unable to distinguish democracy from anarchy, or from arbitrary rule!

The myth of creation, or how Kazatomprom knows better than anyone else!

Kazatomprom has not even left its opponents the hope for an alternative solution to the problem of radioactive waste. Where does such lack of appeal, such self-confidence, come from? Does Kazatomprom really know the situation with radioactive waste so well? Is there really a possibility of quickly and effectively dealing not only with our own waste, but with that of others as well?

Truth does not vanish, however, and eventually it comes to light. And the remarkable fact is revealed that “there are no enterprises performing the licensed burial of radioactive waste in the republic. At the present time, the sole licensed enterprise for the temporary burial of radioactive waste (ampoule sources of ionized radiation) is the Baikal-1 site in the city of Kurchatov” (10). It turns out that Kazakhstan lacks any cadastre of contaminated territories. In the opinion of some experts, there are not even the technology and specialists necessary for dealing with waste in a civilized fashion (8).

Will it or no, the question arises: what is Kazatomprom counting on? Is it thinking about repeating the divine act of creation, bringing into being in a week or two the most advanced technology, the specialists, the necessary information, comfortable laws, and “an obedient people”?

Incidentally, dealing with the people may be easier. The head of Kazatomprom has announced that he is against holding a nationwide referendum on importing waste, since the number of informed people greatly exceeds the number of informed ones, and he does not have enough time in his entire life to spend explaining the essence of the issue to each one (The Globe/Vremya po…, October 23, 2001).

Myths are one thing, but the reality may turn out to be far more prosaic. More than once already in our country, the illegal actions of certain “interested persons or agencies” have been legalized by the passage of amendments to existing legislation. In doing so, both the laws’ creators and legislators have demonstrated miraculous flexibility in finding grounds for changing the law.

Is the situation repeating itself this time? Might Kazatomprom already be pursuing some kind of operation, violating state atomic energy policy and the country’s laws? Might its efforts be aimed at legalizing these actions? Perhaps that is why our atomic agency is not hurrying to account for its actions to improve the radiation situation in Kazakhstan?

And is that the reason why its bureaucrats do not want to hear about the human right to a healthy environment, the observance of which would be a serious obstacle to the blossoming of their agency?
* * *

References (in Russian):

1. Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 1103, “On Urgent Measures for Improving the Radiation Situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” December 31, 1992.

2. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 233-1, “On the National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” June 26, 1998 (amended in accordance with Law of the RK NO. 45-II, April 28, 2000).

3. Explanatory note to the draft Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Introducing Amendments and Additions to Certain Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Issues of Radiation Safety,” 2001.

4. Report of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Fulfillment of the Republic Budget for 2001, Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, May 14, 2002.

5. “‘Transparency Kazakhstan’ Presents the Index of Perception of Corruption for 2001,” Toward a Society Without Corruption, 2001, no. 1(6), pp. 4-7.

6. Nuclear Encyclopedia. Moscow, 1996.

7. From an interview with Aleksei Yablokov. Aleksei Yablokov is a doctor of biological sciences, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and an honorable foreign member of the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences. He is a former advisor to the President of Russia and chairman of the Inter-Agency Commission of Environmental Security of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

8. From an interview with Vladimir Kuznetsov. Vladimir Kuznetsov is a member of an association of independent experts on the safe use of atomic energy in the Russian Federation, an expert for a number of committees of the Federal Assembly State Duma of the Russian Federation. He is an engineer and thermal physicist, a former employee of the Chernobyl nuclear power station and head of the inspection service for nuclear and radiation safety of the Russian Federation.

9. Kazakhstan: Priority Areas for Development and a Proposed Action Program for the World Bank, September 2001, pp. iv, v.

10. Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 1006, “On Confirmation of the Program for Conservation of Uranium-Mining Enterprises and Liquidating the Consequences of the Working of Uranium Deposits for 2001-2010,” July 25, 2001.

The Anti-Nuclear Campaign of Non-Governmental Organizations of Kazakhstan.

Campaign coordinators:

Kaisha Atakhanova – Eco-Center, Karaganda,
tel.: (3212) 56-29-22, E-mail: kaisha@nursat.kz

Gulsum Kakimzhanova – IRIS, Semipalatinsk,
tel.: (3222) 62-40-62, 62-25-91, E-mail: iris@relcom.kz

© Ecological Society Green Salvation, 2002.

Translated by Glenn Kempf

Translated September 17, 2002

ANTINUCLEAR CAMPAIGN
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Maksim Shingarkin is the coordinator of Greenpeace Russia’s antinuclear project. He is a dismissed staff officer, having served for ten years in the Twelfth Department of the Ministry of Defense, responsible for nuclear weapons testing, including at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan.

Question: How do you rate the international experience in dealing with radioactive waste?

Answer. Radioactive wastes fall into two categories. The first are ores, formed during production, and the second are connected with the use of radioactive materials in the nuclear industry. For example, at nuclear power stations, wastes with artificial isotopes are produced

There is a basic difference between artificial and natural radioisotopes. The mineral industry of Kazakhstan produces a large amount of dangerous radioactive materials, certainly, including wastes containing natural radioisotopes. However, there is no comparison between these and the danger stemming from artificial radioisotopes. Their radiation is often fatal to living organisms now existing on Earth, or results in their genetic change. But living organisms, including, of course, human beings, never encountered artificial radioisotopes in the course of their evolution. Thus, contact with them is extremely dangerous for future generations. Therefore, any practice in dealing with radioactive substances, with radioactive waste on a global scale, should provide, first of all, reliable isolation of artificial radioactivity from the biosphere. However, no nuclear project, no stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, not one of the most perfect atomic power stations, not one country of the world, have shown to date the complete isolation of artificial radionuclides from the natural environment. Thus, today, on the Earth, a fatally dangerous experiment connected with the introduction of artificial radioactivity into the natural balance is being conducted. It is an experiment that after several generations may end in the destruction of individual species, or even all life on Earth.
Question: Do you know of any states that import radioactive waste from other countries and bury it on their own territory?

Answer. As far as I know, officially no country of the world accepts another’s radioactive waste for burial on its own territory. Moreover, the legislation of some states categorically forbid not only such imports, but even to raise the question of possible imports. Thus, for example, in the Islamic state of the United Arab Emirates even discussing the possibility of importing radioactive waste is prosecuted by law, and actual import is punishable by the death penalty. The African countries have passed a resolution forbidding the importing of radioactive and chemical wastes on the territory of Africa. Thus, no country of the world, even the most backward African country, imports radioactive materials of foreign manufacture for burial on its own territory. Not even the poorest country in the world! And nothing can prevent the peoples of these countries from opposing such desires by the “powers that be.” We know that any attempt to reconsider such legislation, even in backward countries, will be considered by the world community as the destruction of the international system of environmental protection.
Question: What problems might the Republic of Kazakhstan encounter, if the decision on the import and burial of radioactive waste is nevertheless adopted?

Answer. Raising the question of the importing of foreign radioactive materials and waste into Kazakhstan is, above all, testimony to the absence of political culture in the country’s leadership. Because it is impossible to construct a national economy if you transform the territory of your own state into an international dumping ground for nuclear waste. It is impossible to ensure the reproduction of a healthy population if radioactivity collected from the entire world will be affecting it. It is impossible to become an industrially advanced country if you perform manual labor for the industrially advanced countries. A state that lacks the social and technological base for its own development, but cultivates an attitude of dependence on gifts from others, having sold off its own native land, cannot occupy a worthy place in the system of the international division of labor. And nobody will be able change the image of such country in for centuries on end, because it is enough to stick one leg into radioactive waste, and this radioactive trail will last for many, many generations of the inhabitants of the Earth.
Question: Is the import and burial of radioactive waste on the territory of Kazakhstan only the country’s internal affair?

Answer. If we talk about the Republic of Kazakhstan in particular, its special feature is that it is, above all, a multinational state. The interests of the peoples living on its territory, including their genetic safety, are not enclosed within the borders of one state. They are tied to the fates of the peoples living beyond its limits. Accordingly, if the peoples living on the territory of Kazakhstan will be exposed to risk, particularly as a result of the impact of radiation (which will result in genetic damage), it means that the peoples of the neighboring countries will be exposed to risk. This is the simplest point. In addition, there are many other interrelationships. From the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, major rivers flow into the territory of the countries that border it. Contamination of these rivers directly threatens the population living along their banks in other states. Kazakhstan has no outlet to the sea, and the import of radioactive materials is possible only through the territory of neighboring countries. The transportation of radioactive materials is known to be the riskiest part of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is this weak link that attracts the interest of terrorist groups, and people’s fate may depend on the whim of fate alone. Therefore, the neighboring states cannot react quietly to such a statement. In addition, there is also public opinion, which will affect the leaders of the neighboring countries. Let’s put it this way: we in Russia will do our utmost to prevent the transport of radioactive waste to Kazakhstan through the territory of our country. And we will find arguments to convince the public of other states not to permit it either. Our organization, Greenpeace of Russia, and Greenpeace International will do all we can.
Question: Who does the introduction of legislative amendments on the import of radioactive waste benefit, besides Kazatomprom itself?

Answer. First, the revenues will hardly be received by the entire industry. They will be received by individual managers within this sector, and this money will never appear either in the economy of Kazakhstan, or in the economy of any other country. It will be compensation money for the sale of territory. It is black money, which does not bring happiness even to its owners. Second: it’s completely clear that today, when the world stands on the eve of a new technological revolution, counterrevolutions are taking place in industry, including the power industry. The nuclear power sector, which has a premonition of impending doom, is taking optimizing steps worldwide. It is trying to use the international division of labor to find the cheapest niche for its own existence. And this is already reflected, over the decades, in the economy of Kazakhstan. The fact is that the Russian nuclear industry organized an entire campaign for the artificial reduction of the price of uranium mined in Kazakhstan, with the aim of cutting the cost of nuclear fuel. Today, by their estimate, for each kilogram of exported uranium Kazakhstan receives only 50 % of the price that could be currently set.

The primary weak link in nuclear power is the problem of enriched nuclear fuel and the burial of radioactive waste. And here, suddenly, a universal solution has been found. Today, two countries in the world deliver uranium to the global market for fabulously low prices. Due to these contracts, the leadership and upper management of the nuclear industry are fed. Unique conditions are created, under which, by using money obtained from the sale of uranium, it is possible to buy politicians, officials and even public opinion, as has been clearly demonstrated both in Russia and in Kazakhstan. The unprecedented policy of transforming the territory of two great states into international nuclear dumps starts here, with the changes in Russian and Kazakhstani legislation. These are not simple parts of one whole; they are a natural intersection of the interests of the nuclear departments of the two countries, and at the same time, a closed technological chain. Russia will process the enriched nuclear fuel, and the radioactive waste will be delivered to Kazakhstan. The people of the two nations will carry out the dirtiest, most dangerous work for the safe countries: Japan, France, Great Britain and the United States. It is these peoples that the global nuclear establishment has selected for the role of a clean-up crew for their own nuclear needs. And these people have no way to tell their own governments that this should not take place. The people of Russia and Kazakhstan have the right to establish priorities, to create a high-tech economy, and to rescue their own land from the invasion of foreign radioactive waste.

Interview conducted by Sergey Solyanik, member of the Ecological Society Green Salvation.

Prepared for printing June 25, 2002

Translated July 30, 2002

ANTINUCLEAR CAMPAIGN
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Valery Menshchikov

Valery Fyodorovich Menshchikov is a physicist, a member of the Council of the Center for Environmental Policy of Russia (CEPR), and a member of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Program of the Social-Ecological Union (jointly with CEPR). From 1990 to 1993, he was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and vice president of the Committee on the Environment, where he was in charge of issues involving nuclear and radiation safety. Later, he worked on the staff of the Russian Federation’s Security Council as the secretary of the Interdepartmental Commission on Environmental Safety.

In recent years, he has been occupied with questions of the legal regulation of problems of nuclear and radiation safety, the analysis of risk in the nuclear sector, and the problems of dealing with radioactive waste.

Question: Do you know of any states that import radioactive wastes from other countries and bury them on their own territory?

Answer: I do not know of any such countries — no civilized countries, anyway. This is, of course an arbitrary concept—the “civilized country”; nevertheless, such a general name exists for countries that care, above all for their people, their health, etc.—it’s a sign of civilization, all the same. The national legislatures of the major powers, especially the “nuclear five,” forbid the import of radioactive waste from other countries. In addition, let’s remember the Basel Convention of 1989 for the control of transboundary transportation of hazardous wastes and their removal, according to which transboundary transportation of hazardous industrial wastes and their storage are forbidden at the international level. Radioactive waste obviously falls under the category of hazardous wastes. I do not know about Kazakhstan, but Russia ratified this convention in 1994.

Question: What problems might the Republic of Kazakhstan encounter, if the decision to import and bury radioactive waste is adopted nevertheless?

Answer: I would like to answer first as a physicist. A wide range of substances with various levels of activity falls into the category of radioactive waste. In general, in the world and in our country, they are classified according to their level of activity: low-level, mid-level, and high-level. They can exist in various states: liquid, solid (we don’t take gaseous materials — you can’t transport them). From the beginning of the development of nuclear power, radioactive wastes created at various enterprises, as well as in the use of nuclear materials in industry, medicine, etc., represent the most serious problem for the further development of this sector. For example, the volume of radioactive waste in the countries of the European Economic Community from working reactors and their subsequent dismantling will total 1.7 million tons. More than 95 % of this volume is low-level waste. All of this radioactive inheritance must be stored for many years within the limits of the national territories under strict control. In Kazakhstan, the people belonging to the nuclear industry are competent and well-educated experts, and what they are talking about is probably the desire to provide services for the storage and burial of low- and lid-level wastes. What state will they arrive in — iquid or solid? Will they be encased in any kind of a (concrete, bitumen, etc.)? What will be the level of heat transfer in their transportation and storage? What radioactive gases will arise in dealing with the waste? There are dozens of questions in the area of radiation safety. The storage of radioactive waste is a very complex and specific process, a special industry, which must operate and supervise storage facilities for many decades (sometimes centuries). For example, in Germany, in licensing storage facilities the same requirements as for other nuclear installations, as well as requirements usually applied to mining facilities, are imposed.

One more problem is the problem of setting norms. Many countries from which radioactive waste might come have their own classifications for these wastes. The International Atomic Energy Commission has one, Russia another, and America has another one altogether, different from ours. Therefore, these scales might shift, and there might be a mismatch. Let’s say that according to the classification “mid-level waste” you’re prepared for one situation, but suddenly it turns out, in fact to be more threatening, and you don’t have a prepared container, protective barrier, etc. Therefore, thus far there are more questions than answers. Obviously, Kazatomprom [Kazakhstan’s state nuclear power company] is obligated to present for examination and to the public at large a detailed program for dealing with radioactive waste (both its own and that proposed for importing).

The financial side. If low-level waste can be stored without significant expenditures and large resources, for mid-level waste reliably protected and expensive storage facilities are already necessary. In the case of importing radioactive waste into the Republic of Kazakhstan, as I understand, nobody will take back the waste brought there. It would be naive to think that someone will say, “We’re only importing it for temporary storage.” Hence, it is necessary to solve the problem of a final burial place for the waste. In Sweden, according to its program for dealing with radioactive waste, for final removal of low- and mid-level waste a storage site located a kilometer from the coastline, under a layer of seawater, and sunk 60 meters into a crystalline rock formation on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, was created. The cost of building and operating such a storage facility runs into the millions of dollars. We are told that in Kazakhstan there are already many sites allegedly adapted for the storage of radioactive waste. But if it’s a pit or a mining site for the production of uranium ore, then at the given site the hydrography, geology, and any other natural environmental conditions are disrupted. Thus, the migration of radionuclides along underground horizons, hit them in underground waters, and their spread over a considerable territory is possible. When in the USSR industrial nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were carried out, they were preceded by the extensive and scrupulous study of the geology at the blast sites. However, decades later it turned out that the geological picture was incomplete and inexact, and that radionuclides are now penetrating, together with groundwater, into drilling sites for oil, gas, and so on.

There are also political questions. I treat Kazakhstan with huge respect, and I consider it to be a truly civilized country, but this will be a unique and very dangerous precedent. For the first time, a country of this rank will accept dangerous industrial wastes on its own territory. It’s probably not necessary to offend African or other underdeveloped countries, but it reminds me of the situation when firms took dangerous poisonous substances their in barrels. It was at the level of deals with any corrupt African government. I would very much not like to make even approximate analogies, but I repeat: it is a very dangerous precedent, in my view, undermining the country’s authority and creating a negative attitude toward it in the rest of the civilized world. The opinion might be created that in Central Asia, too, there is a state similar to the African ones, ready to accept the dirtiest and most dangerous wastes from all over the world.

Question: Is the import and burial of radioactive waste on the territory of Kazakhstan the country’s own internal affair?

Answer: To discuss this question is, of course, the internal business of Kazakhstan. To make a decision, undoubtedly touching major questions of the safety of the population and territory of the adjoining countries—of course, it is better to have consulted with them. Even at the preliminary stage, consultations are desirable. I believe that our non-governmental organizations in Russia and Kazakhstan should collectively discuss topics that concern the interests of these friendly neighboring states. At the departmental level, as I understand, consultations of this kind between Minatom [the Ministry of Atomic Energy] of Russia and Kazatomprom necessarily take place. Obviously, there is a certain mutual understanding between them, and Minatom of Russia may be ready to offer technical assistance. However, we have precedents, when Minatom of Russia, from our point of view, also made incorrect decisions, announcing completely fantastic plans, and each time saying that it was for the sake of resolving environmental problems.

One example involves the delivery to Russia of foreign enriched nuclear fuel (ENF). The magic 20 billion dollars, which should ostensibly enter Russia’s state budget, Minatom’s budget, and the budget of territories that must be rehabilitated, do not exist. And in the coming years, as the minister of atomic energy, Mr. Rumyantsev, recently confirmed in a meeting with ecologists, even further contracts are not expected: there is no market, or it is blocked by the competitors. Hence, we notice a completely different turn of events. Many deputies of our parliament voted to permit the import of ENF to Russia, assuming that huge sums of money would appear and part of them really would go toward solving environmental problems. I think, that the figures announced in Kazakhstan are also unreal. This is visible, for instance, in the case of the immeasurably more powerful Minatom of Russia, which the world treats with much more attention and respect on many issues, because here there are nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, this ministry could not realize its financial and budget ideas, its fantasies, either. People that understand the situation warned immediately that there will be no 20 billion dollars, that, God willing, there might be some small deliveries, but all this was not heard. Today it is a real fact. Therefore, I can tell you beforehand that 2 billion, and 20 billion, and 40 billion, are a fantasy.

Question: Does it seem to you that the amendments to Russian legislation that have been passed, and the campaign unleashed by Kazatomprom for the adoption of similar amendments, are parts of a single goal?

Answer: I think that it’s impossible to say that they are parts of a single goal; it is simply an identical search for a way out of the dead end in which both our countries have found themselves. There is an enormous inheritance from the [Soviet] nuclear programs, above all those of the military. This is characteristic of Russia. Ninety percent of all the radiation problems that have accumulated in the past are the heritage of military programs. It was necessary to create a bomb in an insanely short amount of time, and later the arms race began; in the Urals and Siberia three secret enterprises for processing weapons-grade plutonium and uranium were constructed. Back then the main priority was time. Therefore, nobody paid attention to the environment or to people, even the workers themselves. You see, in the early years they didn’t know how radiation affects the body. As a result, the cold war ended without glory, and the next generation has received the world’s largest inheritance of radiation. Thus, today’s attempts to find money to clean up these radioactive dumps are a normal human reaction, which in Russia finds understanding among the members of Parliament. It’s a normal desire, but we have already become convinced that they are trying to solve it while looking after their own departmental interests. And departmental interests are becoming increasingly dominant, swallowing up the social side, pulling in into the shadow of “non-transparency,” since in Russia this department to date has also been engaged in military development. It is, as they say, “the guys’ secret.” Therefore even the parliament of Russia, not to mention the public, cannot verify the distribution of money within our nuclear department. Here there are obvious contradictions between noble thoughts and their realization.

Russia’s Minatom is not simply one building, where the officials sit. It is an entire government infrastructure, with closed cities, nuclear complexes, a huge number of people, and dozens of research institutes. Here in Moscow, we have more than ten of them. One alone, the Kurchatov Institute, works on a wide range of subjects, including nuclear physics, the programs of nuclear power stations, rehabilitation of territories, and many other problems. It is clear that without this scientific potential, for Kazakhstan it will be very difficult. Of course, Kazakhstan has its own nuclear center, and it, too, is not simply a group of managers who operate something. Therefore, consultations naturally take place, and mutual enrichment through the exchange of ideas occurs. I think that it’s a normal process, which doesn’t disturb anything. Only in this sense is it possible to talk about “parts of a single goal.” However, from my point of view, there are differences as well. In Russian society, including among the experts at Minatom and Gosatomnadzor [the State Atomic Inspection Agency], there is a completely negative attitude toward importing radioactive waste onto our territory. Even in parliament, when the laws on importing enriched nuclear fuel were discussed, there were attempts to remove the words “enriched nuclear fuel,” because society does not accept it, does not understand it, and will not understand it in the near future. Today, Russia’s position is precisely reflected in the new law “On Environmental Protection” (passed in 2002), in which the ban on importing radioactive waste from other states was confirmed.

Question: To whom is the inclusion in the legislation of the amendments on the import of radioactive waste beneficial, apart from Kazatomprom itself?

Answer: I can answer this question only by our own example, although I always emphasize, that our states are birds from the same nest: the political or social situations that arise are very similar.

When the laws on importing enriched fuel were discussed, it turned out that for dealing with public opinion and with the deputies, the top management of Minatom of Russia put forward some very noble ideas. Two of them were as follows: “Most of the money will go toward rehabilitation of the damaged territories,” and “We support the development of advanced technologies.”

However I emphasize, that in the next 20-25 years we cannot process the enriched nuclear fuel, if it comes to us at all, and not from Russian reactors. And that means that for the life of one generation, we will only be storing it. We have plans for storage facilities; there is a half-filled store site near Krasnoyarsk at the Mining and Chemical Combine, housing enriched piles from VVER-1000 reactors. A start has been made, but we can’t talk about any kind of processing. It is a kind of fiction, a kind of screen, that we possess high technology, that we’re an advanced superpower, that the Americans have lagged behind us in this area. Hence, in “pushing” for the laws on importing enriched nuclear fuel, the representatives of Minatom of Russia committed the same error as the deputies in talking about advanced technologies. They really exist, but in other areas. Those that we have in the sphere of processing enriched nuclear fuel are the dirtiest technological processes, from an environmental standpoint, developed with the sole purpose of producing fissionable components for a nuclear weapon. That is, Minatom’s interests were draped in noble intentions, by which part of the body of deputies were “bought.”

The lobbyists’ activity was obvious; it was seen and recorded. And these were not physicists, and above all, not experts from Minatom. Therefore, a naпve questions arises: “Why is it that you guys, with such fuss and bother, not sleeping, not resting, lobby for Minatom’s program? Something here is not clear.” This means that they are, in fact, interested in it. It is possible to create different hypotheses, but I know well enough what a powerful PR structure Minatom of Russia possesses for dealing with the public. It has unlimited access to the mass media, a modern television studio, publication of very expensive magazines for the general public, newspapers, etc. Minatom’s resources can’t be compared to the resources of the critics of its position. It has a lot of money, in order to present its point of view on TV and hold large-scale events. It has enough means to individually explain its position to each worried deputy or fraction. I think that the same situation applies to Kazakhstan. There can be a difference only in one thing: for the last ten years in Russia, another point of view—the point of view of non-governmental environmental organizations and some political parties—was formed all the same, and the public has heard the representatives of these organizations and parties.

One example of this is the preparations for the All-Russia Referendum on Nature Protection, which demonstrated the previously unknown unanimity of the population on this issue. The initiative group gathered about 2.5 million signatures. More than 80 % of the respondents, to the question “Are you for or against the importing of enriched nuclear fuel?”, answered “Against.” Such a result in the Russian Federation never occurred in the discussion of other serious issues. This means that despite Minatom’s enormous resources, the ministry has not proved to the community the validity and financial transparency of its plans. The community hasn’t believed it. It has already become competent enough to sort through the issue, and it understands that the nuclear department has not provided convincing arguments in terms of safety for people and the environment.

Interview conducted by Sergey Solyanik, member of the Environmental Society Green Salvation.

Prepared for print June 5, 2002

Translated July 15, 2002